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INTRODUCTION

T

he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated in 1938 to
provide the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination” of all
1
civil actions. The underlying theme of the Federal Rules is that
2
meritorious litigants should have their day in court. To that end, the
1

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the
Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288
(2013) (“As has been recognized repeatedly by the Supreme Court, the distinguished
proceduralists who drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen access to the courts and in
the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or obfuscation.”).
2
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Federal Rules eliminated procedural pitfalls, including highly
technical forms of action inherited from common law, that rewarded
mastery of pleading techniques over the substantive merits of claims.
The Federal Rules also introduced a simplified pleading system,
3
commonly denominated as “notice pleading,” thereby easing the
heavy burden imposed on the parties. The factual details of the case
could then be developed through pretrial discovery. The aim was to
facilitate, not to discourage, trial on the merits.
Unfortunately, the stated goal of the Federal Rules to provide the
“just, speedy, and inexpensive” determination of all civil disputes has
grown elusive. The world has changed significantly in the seventyfive years since the Federal Rules were initially promulgated.
Litigation in federal courts has become very expensive and unduly
lengthy. The cost, length, and complexity of federal cases has made it
riskier to proceed in federal court. More importantly, many, including
Justices on the Supreme Court, question the ability of federal judges
4
to reach good outcomes.
The federal civil justice system is now at the crossroads. Many
putative litigants have chosen to opt out of the courts in favor of some
form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), which they perceive as
cheaper, faster, more private, and less risky than the court system.
Others opt for foreign forums to avoid the perceived harshness of
some American laws. Even those matters that are filed in the courts
rarely go to trial—they are either settled or dismissed on motion.
While settlement of disputes is normally viewed as desirable,
settlements that are prompted solely by economic concerns totally
divorced from the merits of any claims are troublesome. The judicial
response to the problems of cost and complexity, typified by Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and its progeny, is to dismiss poorly

3 See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 68,
at 471 (7th ed. 2011) [hereinafter WRIGHT & KANE]; Charles E. Clark, The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure: 1938–1958, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 450–51 (1958). Not surprisingly,
these concerns were not unfounded. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
555 n.3 (2007) (rejecting the notion “that the Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the
pleading of facts altogether”).
4 See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 414
(2004) (acknowledging that failure to comply with technology sharing requirements under
Telecommunications Act “can be difficult” for a court to evaluate, and identifying
exclusionary conduct would prove a “daunting task” for “generalist” antitrust courts
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

CAVANAGH (DO NOT DELETE)

634

3/24/2015 10:33 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93, 631

pleaded cases at the outset of the litigation, irrespective of substantive
merit.
The unintended consequence of these phenomena—the exodus
from the court system in favor of ADR, settlements, and Twombly—is
5
that civil trials are fast becoming obsolete. That is most undesirable.
The availability of a judicial forum to decide claims on the merits
remains important because it assists in the development of a rational
legal system that is predictable and accessible to the public and that
produces outcomes that are fair to the litigants. Yet, if the federal
courts stand pat and do not take steps to control the costs of litigation,
the continued slide to irrelevance is inevitable.
Fortunately, the court system can reverse this decline. The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure provide all the necessary tools to control
costs, minimize delays, and limit the length and complexity of trials.
Courts simply need to implement these rules in the day-to-day
management of litigation. In addition, by incorporating technological
advances, courts can reduce costs, simplify trials, and achieve better
outcomes. The judicial system is clearly up to these tasks. Now is the
time to act.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure represented a marked
departure from the pleading rules developed at common law and built
on the improvements introduced by the Field Code and similar reform
6
statutes. First, the Federal Rules created uniform rules of practice
and procedure throughout the federal civil justice system. Prior to the
Federal Rules, federal practice and procedure was governed by the
7
law of the state in which the federal court was sitting. The adoption
5 See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts,
60 DUKE L.J. 745, 747 (2010) (“[T]rials are an increasingly small part of the daily routine
of the federal trial courts. Most district courts now try very few civil or criminal cases
. . . .”).
6 See Miller, supra note 2, at 288–89 (“Because the rulemakers were deeply steeped in
the history of the debilitating technicalities and rigidity that characterized the prior English
and American procedural systems—that is, the common law forms of action and then the
codes―the Rules established an easily satisfied pleading regime for stating a grievance
that abjured factual triviality, verbosity, and technicality.”).
7 In a series of laws, known as Conformity Acts, Congress directed the federal courts to
follow state rules of pleading and practice. See 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
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of uniform rules assured that results in like cases litigated in different
federal venues would not diverge solely because of differences in
local procedural rules.
Second, the Federal Rules modernized pleading and practice by (1)
eliminating the formal distinctions between law and equity; (2)
reducing the number of pleadings to three, thus doing away with the
endless paper exchange that characterized common law pleadings;
8
and (3) abolishing technical forms of pleading. In addition, the
9
Federal Rules introduced a simplified pleading system. A pleading
no longer would have to fit within the confines of a cause of action
10
cognizable at common law. Nor would the complaint have to
contain a detailed factual recitation of all the elements necessary to
11
make out a cause of action.
Rather, the complaint would simply have to provide sufficient
factual information to put the defendant on notice of the claim and the
12
grounds upon which it rests. This simplified pleading system,
known universally as “notice pleading,” is the cornerstone of the
13
Federal Rules. It was adopted because the drafters concluded that
14
historically, the complainant had been asked to do too much. It was
MILLER ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1002 (3d ed. 2004) [hereinafter
WRIGHT & MILLER].
8 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, 63 S.C. L. REV. 97, 105 (2011)
[hereinafter Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly]; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 2, 7(a), 8(a).
Rule 7(a) allows only for complaints, answers, and replies to answers. FED. R. CIV. P. 7(a).
9 Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105; see also FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a).
10 Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105.
11 Id.; see also FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
12 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 289 (“As exemplified by
several of the skeletal Official Forms attached to the Rules, the pleader merely had to say
that she felt aggrieved and state what was desired—something metaphorically analogous
to Oliver Twist’s simple request, ‘Please, sir . . . I want more [gruel].’” (alteration in
original)).
13 Charles E. Clark, The Influence of Federal Procedural Reform, 13 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 144, 154 (1948); Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 106.
14 See Charles E. Clark, Simplified Pleading, 27 IOWA L. REV. 272, 277 (1942).
Therefore, it may be concluded that this tendency to seek admissions by detailed
pleadings is at best wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming, at most productive
of confusion as to the real merits of the cause and even of actual denial of justice.
The continuous experience from common-law pleading down through the
reversions to pleading formalities recurring under code pleading indicates the
necessity of having clearly in mind the limited, but important, purposes of
pleading and how they cannot be pressed wisely beyond such purposes. It
demonstrates, in the writer’s judgment, the necessity of procedural rules which
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simply unrealistic to expect a complaint to contain a detailed factual
recitation of any claim at the outset of the case, especially when at
least some information was within the exclusive control of the
defendant. The notice function, on the other hand, is a role for which
the pleadings are well-suited. The factual details underlying the claim
15
could be fleshed out in discovery.
Discovery was the “Cinderella of the changes” under the Federal
16
Rules. The mandatory exchange of information prior to trial is
designed to prevent unfair surprise and to limit the number of issues
tried by encouraging admissions of fact and elimination of claims and
17
defenses for which there is no factual support. It also facilitates
settlement of claims. Discovery fundamentally altered the way in
which litigants approached the trial of a lawsuit. Discovery equalizes
18
access to proof and thereby levels the litigation playing field.
Modern civil trials are nothing more than an orderly presentation of
what has been learned in discovery. Trial in the sunshine has replaced
19
trial by ambush.
Third, the guiding principle of the Federal Rules is that litigants
20
with meritorious claims ought to have their day in court. Looking
back from a twenty-first century perspective, this goal seems rather
modest. Yet, it was, and remains, very significant. At common law,
21
the goal was to avoid trial. It is thus not surprising that common law
procedures were complicated and difficult to navigate, and that one
22
misstep could lead to dismissal with prejudice. Similarly, strict
enforce the mandate of simplicity and directness and which are made real and
compelling by illustrative forms showing what this simplicity means in actual
experience. And it demonstrates further the need of a continuing rules committee
to watch lest through habit and practice form comes to dominate substance.
Id.
15

See Miller, supra note 2, at 289.
WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 3, § 81, at 577.
17 See id. § 81, at 577–78.
18 See Miller, supra note 2, at 289.
19 See Raoul Berger & Abe Karsh, Government Immunity from Discovery, 59 YALE L.J.
1451, 1451 (1950).
20 See Miller, supra note 2, at 286; see also Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1901, 1906 (1989) [hereinafter Weinstein, After Fifty Years] (“The drafters’
commitment was to a civil practice in which all parties would have ready access to the
courts and to relevant information, a practice in which the merits would be reached
promptly and decided fairly. Every claimant would get a meaningful day in court.”).
21 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105, 119.
22 See Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 433, 437 (1986).
16
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pleading requirements often made it difficult to get past motions to
23
dismiss. The Federal Rules eliminated the land mines from the
24
litigation landscape so as to facilitate trial. The Federal Rules focus
on the substance of the claim or defense and not on the manner in
25
which it is pleaded. If the claim is meritorious, then the claim
26
should go to trial.
In sum, the drafters of the Federal Rules designed a system in
which (1) all parties would have access to the courts, (2) parties
would have access to information relevant to their claims and
27
defenses through pretrial discovery, (3) the courts would promptly
and fairly decide cases, and (4) parties would have their day in
28
court. The federal courthouse was the “beacon” which would guide
29
the aggrieved to a just result. However, fewer and fewer civil cases
30
are tried in federal courts. Recent Supreme Court cases have
31
encouraged disposition prior to trial; and, with that reality in mind,
litigants may be more willing to settle their disputes. In short, the
reality of federal civil litigation today differs significantly from the
vision of the drafters of the Federal Rules.
B. What Went Wrong?
32

For their first decade or so, the Federal Rules worked well.
33
Despite some guerilla opposition, federal courts and litigants largely

23 See id. (“[T]he defendant could take comfort in the prospect that the plaintiff could
ultimately lose because his lawyer bungled the pleading war.”).
24 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 105.
25 See id.
26 Id.
27 WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 3, § 81, at 577.
28 See Weinstein, After Fifty Years, supra note 20, at 1906.
29 Id.
30 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 747.
31 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (noting that
deficient claims should “‘be exposed at the point of minimum expenditure of time and
money by the parties and the court’” (citations omitted)).
32 See Rebecca Love Kourlis, Jordan M. Singer & Natalie Knowlton, Reinvigorating
Pleadings, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 245, 249–50 (2010) (“Initially, lawyers seemed to be on
board with the approach taken by the Federal Rules.”).
33 See, e.g., Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 109–10
(S.D.N.Y. 1956).
If a complaint contains nothing more than general allegations that defendants
have violated various provisions of the anti-trust laws combined with a prayer for
relief, such a pleading, . . . becomes a springboard from which the parties dive
off into an almost bottomless sea of interrogatories, depositions, and pre-trial
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34

accepted notice pleading. From time to time, the Rules were
35
amended, but the changes were incremental. Federal litigation
36
flourished under these Rules. Yet, as early as 1951, the judiciary
recognized the changing nature of litigation in the federal courts—
specifically that federal antitrust litigation was growing more complex
and expensive—and established a committee to study the implications
37
of these changes. Thereafter, the Judicial Conference of the United
States commissioned the Handbook of Recommended Procedures for
38
the Trial of Protracted Cases. In the preface to the Handbook, the
drafters pointed out that the growth in size and complexity of
American business litigation in federal courts:
proceedings on collateral issues, most of which may have little relationship to the
true issue in the case.
Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
34 See Kourlis, Singer & Knowlton, supra note 32, at 249–50.
35 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 107.
36 Id.
37 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., THE REPORT: PROCEDURE IN ANTI-TRUST AND
OTHER PROTRACTED CASES (1951), reprinted in Leon R. Yankwich, “Short Cuts” in
Long Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 62 (1951) [hereinafter The Prettyman Report]; see also Breck
P. McAllister, The Big Case: Procedural Problems in Antitrust Litigation, 64 HARV. L.
REV. 27, 27–29 (1950); see generally Wm. Dwight Whitney, The Trial of an Anti-Trust
Case, 5 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 449 (1950) (discussing procedural forms that could ease
expanding antitrust litigation); Milton Handler, Anti-Trust—New Frontiers and New
Perplexities, 6 REC. ASS’N B. CITY N.Y. 59 (1951); Leon R. Yankwich, Observations on
Anti-Trust Procedures, 10 F.R.D. 165 (1951); John T. Chadwell & Richard W. McLaren,
The Current Status of the Antitrust Laws, U. ILL. L.F. 491 (1950). The Prettyman Report
addressed problems that
arise[] when a case brought to the court involves, potentially, many issues, many
defendants, hundreds of exhibits, thousands of pages of testimony, weeks or
months of hearings, and hundreds of thousands of dollars. A few sample cases
and the material involved are: the Hartford-Empire (glass container) case . . . , in
which 3,300 exhibits were considered and 18,000 pages of record made; the
Libbey-Owens-Ford (flat glass) case . . . , in which 6,000 exhibits were proposed
to be offered and 900 were eventually received; the A. & P. case . . . , which
involved 7,000 exhibits and 45,000 pages of testimony; the United Shoe
Machinery case . . . , in which the Government offered 4,600 exhibits at one
time; the Alcoa case . . . involved 15,000 pages of record; the National Lead case
. . . , [involved] 1,400 exhibits and 5,000 pages of record; there were 3,700
exhibits in the Imperial Chemical Industries case . . . and 10,600 were processed
in the Investment Bankers case . . . ; in the American Can Company case . . .
1,773 exhibits were offered, and in the Food and Grocery Company case . . .
1,407; Ferguson v. Ford and Dearborn . . . contains 27,000 exhibits and 70,000
pages of record.
The Prettyman Report, supra note 37, at 63–64.
38 JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY GRP. ON PROCEDURE IN PROTRACTED LITIG.,
HANDBOOK OF RECOMMENDED PROCEDURES FOR THE TRIAL OF PROTRACTED CASES
(1960).
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Modern American business is big and complex, consequently,
many of its controversies are big and complex. But procedure of the
courtroom was designed in simpler times and for simpler disputes.
In its established methods it is unable to cope with the tangled
skeins of vast business conflicts. Such lawsuits involve hundreds—
even thousands—of documents, and thousands—even tens of
thousands—of pages of testimony, and weeks and months and even
years of trial. The normal course is ponderous, expensive and timeconsuming. But more dangerous is the burial of relevant, material
nuggets of fact in dunes of the irrelevant or immaterial. Accuracy in
the disposition of issues, the supreme aim of adjudication, becomes
more and more difficult. So the normal processes of the courts have
become more and more unsatisfactory in some types of litigation.
Let it be emphasized this is not the ordinary litigation. Our subject
is rare in number, the truly complicated, a few hundred
amid the
39
tens of thousands of cases on federal court calendars.

The drafters were quick to identify the sources of these difficulties:
The chief faults causing the difficulties in protracted cases were
easily uncovered. They were (1) lack of central control, so that
issues were cloudy, examination and cross-examination meandering
and proffered material unlimited; (2) inadequate organization of
personnel and material prior to the beginning of formalities, an
absolute essential to any successful performance involving numbers
of people or masses of materials; (3) lack of an over-all plan for
proceeding; and (4) an obstinate adherence to the possible use of
surprise as a tactic, a tactic obviously impossible in proceedings
such as these.
Time and thought have yielded suggestions for
40
remedies.

Commentators, even in those early days, focused on discovery as a
41
root cause of expense, length, and delay in big cases. Concerns with
the Federal Rules intensified in the 1960s as the litigation landscape
continued to change and federal cases grew even larger in size, scope,
and complexity. For example, the federal government’s criminal
prosecutions in the Electrical Equipment Cases spawned some two
thousand follow-up private, civil treble damage antitrust actions,
42
thereby ushering in the Big Case Era in antitrust. Suddenly,
multiparty, multidistrict litigation became commonplace, imposing an
39

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
41 See Leon R. Yankwich, “Short Cuts” in Long Cases: A Commentary on the Report
Entitled Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 83 (1953).
42 Robert A. Cahn, A Look at the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, 72 F.R.D.
211, 211 (1976); see Tony A. Freyer, What Was Warren Court Antitrust?, 2009 SUP. CT.
REV. 347, 359 (“following the massive electrical equipment cases, private litigation also
proliferated”).
40
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enormous burden on the federal judiciary. To ease this burden,
Congress created the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation, which
made it possible to consolidate before one federal judge, for pretrial
purposes, cases involving common claims against the same
43
defendants.
Procedural changes also contributed to this trend. In 1966, Rule 23
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended to liberalize
procedures for class actions, making some types of cases, particularly
antitrust and securities matters, more complex and much more
44
expensive to litigate. In addition, changes in substantive law,
notably the enactment of stronger civil rights laws and environmental
laws allowing private rights of action, helped to reshape federal
dockets. Similarly, judicial endorsement of products liability theories,
which made it easier for plaintiffs to recover in personal injury cases,
led to an influx of torts suits. Courts also began to recognize and
embrace scientific evidence, when that evidence could shed light on
liability and damage issues.
Moreover, dramatic advances in technology made it both possible
and efficient for litigants to create, generate, distribute, store, and
retrieve mountains of data. As a result, litigants typically have access
to vast troves of electronically stored information (ESI). However, the
sheer volume of such data may literally bury courts and litigants in
paper; and the costs of locating, retrieving, and utilizing ESI are
prohibitive. Word processing significantly lowered the cost of
preparing pleadings, discovery requests and responses, motions,
briefs, and other court papers. Technological advances have also
dramatically altered the mode and presentation of evidence at trials.
Additionally, greater sophistication on the part of enforcement
agencies and the wrongdoers that they prosecute has led to more
complicated cases.
Finally, discovery has not always operated in the cooperative and
45
collegial manner anticipated by the drafters.
Discovery was
43

28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note.
45 See Grider v. Keystone Health Plan Cent., Inc., 580 F.3d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 2009).
It would be reasonable to expect, in light of all the applicable rules and governing
precedents, that experienced attorneys, especially those who have handled major
litigation, would be able to proceed through the discovery and pretrial stages with
a conciliatory attitude and a minimum of obstruction, and that, under the guiding
hand of the district court, the path to ultimate disposition would be a relatively
smooth one.
Id.
44
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conceived by the drafters of the Federal Rules largely as a selfpolicing enterprise, with judicial intervention necessary only when the
process breaks down. While discovery may proceed appropriately in
many, if not most, federal civil cases, there is significant empirical
46
research showing that discovery is problematic in complex cases.
Discovery abuse takes many forms—overdiscovery, failure to comply
with legitimate discovery requests, redundant requests, inundating the
discovering party with reams of paper, and frivolous objections, for
example—and it inevitably creates costly and unproductive satellite
litigation.
Nor did the drafters of the Federal Rules foresee that the
procedures put in place under the rules would lead to a loss of
confidence in the civil justice system. Among defendants and those
likely to be named as defendants, a growing distrust of juries
47
emerged. Perceptions of runaway juries fueled calls for tort reform,
a euphemism for hard caps on damage recoveries or out-and-out
48
limitations on the right to sue. The ability of lay jurors to reach
reasoned results in complex litigation has also been called into
49
question.
At first blush, criticisms of juries seem harsh. Juries are revered in
50
the American civil justice system. The right to a jury trial is rooted
in the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. It is
particularly noteworthy that under English law, the source of the
American jury system, the right to a jury trial has never been viewed
as constitutional in nature. Not everyone shares the American
reverence for juries. If you were to tell a defendant in a United States
46 Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers’ Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal
Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787, 790 (1980).
47 Michelle L. Findley, Statutory Tort Caps: What States Should Do When Available
Funds Seem Inadequate, 46 IND. L. REV. 849, 853 (2013); see also Madelyn Chortek, The
Psychology of Unknowing: Inadmissible Evidence in Jury and Bench Trials, 32 REV.
LITIG. 117, 128 (2013) (noting an “increasing skepticism and distrust of juries” and
concomitant “widespread assumption that judges are better than juries at avoiding
cognitive pitfalls”).
48 Findley, supra note 47, at 853; see WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION:
WHAT HAPPENED WHEN AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 152–77 (1981).
49 For example, it has been suggested that loss causation calculated by “lie-truth-drop”
is needed because jurors cannot ascertain the financial impact of a misstatement. See John
C. Coffee, Jr., Causation by Presumption? Why the Supreme Court Should Reject
Phantom Losses and Reverse Broudo, 60 BUS. L. 533, 533–34 (2005).
50 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 38.02 [1] (2d ed.
1971) (“The jury is like rock music. Classical theory frowns; the masses applaud. And in a
democracy the felt need of the masses has a claim upon the law.”).
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court who comes from outside of the Anglo-American system that his
or her case will be decided by six individuals, chosen at random, who
know nothing about the parties or the facts, you would likely get
looks of incredulity, if not abject horror.
The distrust of juries also extends to federal judges. Critics of the
federal civil justice system call judges to task for their failure to
control runaway verdicts through remittitur, granting of new trials on
damages issues, or granting motions for judgment notwithstanding the
51
verdict. Trial judges have also been faulted for failure to dismiss
52
infirm cases on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. As a
result—critics contend—defendants are forced to settle cases, not on
the merits, but rather to avoid large outlays to defend against claims
53
of wrongdoing in court.
II
REACTIONS
Litigants have reacted to the perceived ills of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in three ways: (1) by pressing for rule changes, (2) by
seeking changes to procedure through common law, and (3) by opting
out of the judicial system.
A. Rule Changes
The perceived shortcomings of the Federal Rules can be changed
through the amendment process. Initially, the Advisory Committee
was slow to act. Even as cases grew more complicated and expensive
through the 1960s and 1970s, and calls for reform came from many
54
constituencies, the Advisory Committee stood pat and declined to
act. However, as criticism of the pretrial process persisted, the
Advisory Committee responded with significant rule changes in 1983.
51 See, e.g., John E. Sullivan III, Asset Protection for Ohioans: Why the Planning Is
Better Outside Ohio, 20 OHIO PROB. L.J. 74 (2009) (citing DiCosta v. Aeronaves de
Mexico, S.A., 973 F.2d 1490, 1494–98 (9th Cir. 1992)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky,
Closing the Courthouse Doors, 14 GREEN BAG 2D 375, 389–90 (2011) (noting that the
Supreme Court has “dramatically limited the availability of punitive damages based on
distrust of juries” and also distrust of “the ability of trial judges to control their awards”).
52 See Milton Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in
Antitrust Suits−The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 9–12
(1971) [hereinafter Handler, The Shift].
53 Id.
54 See Miller, supra note 2, at 360 (“Even then the defense bar and their clients were
voicing complaints about abusive and frivolous litigation and the need for cost
reduction―the drumbeat was constant and noisy.”).
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1. Early Efforts
In 1976, at a symposium commemorating the seventieth
anniversary of Roscoe Pound’s speech on the popular dissatisfaction
with the administration of justice, the Chief Justice of the United
States Supreme Court and others called for sweeping changes to the
55
federal legal system. Following the 1976 Pound Conference, pretrial
56
discovery became the focal point of criticism. Critics contended that
discovery had gotten out of control, and that high costs forced
innocent defendants to buy peace rather than defend against
57
insubstantial claims. They called courts to task for not controlling
58
discovery. They sought to limit the scope of discovery, attacking the
“relevant to the subject matter” and “reasonably calculated to lead to
59
the discovery of admissible evidence” standards. Critics, however,
failed to craft a satisfactory alternative for standards that had been in
effect since day one of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Advisory Committee resisted efforts to rein in the scope of discovery,
contending that discovery abuse was not pervasive, and choosing
instead to address specific abusive discovery practices in the 1980
60
Amendments. That action did not assuage critics. Justice Powell,
55 See generally Addresses Delivered at the National Conference on the Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 70 F.R.D. 79 (1976).
56 William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the
Justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978) (“Wild fishing
expeditions, since any material which might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence
is discoverable, seem to be the norm.”); see also Paul V. Niemeyer, Is Now the Time for
Simplified Rules of Civil Procedure?, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 673, 678–79 (2013);
Richard L. Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 753–60 (1998).
57 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740–41 (1975); see also
Handler, The Shift, supra note 52, at 9–10 (describing how the costs of responding to
discovery in a class action suit can exceed what individuals can afford and could force
them to settle).
58 See Francis R. Kirkham, Complex Civil Litigation-Have Good Intentions Gone
Awry?, in Addresses Delivered, supra note 55, at 203:
Judges throw up their hands and ask how they can examine a million documents
and say whether they are relevant, and the problem is all too often solved by
simply giving plaintiffs access to all of defendant’s files and records, relevant
and irrelevant. And thus the second evil emerges-a massive and unequalled
invasion of privacy and business records.
See also PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL ON COMPETIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM IN AMERICA 3 (asserting that discovery accounts for more than eighty percent of
the time and cost of litigation).
59 See Am. Bar Ass’n [ABA], Section of Litig., Second Report of the Special
Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 137, 157–58 (1980).
60 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997 (1980).
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describing the 1980 Amendments to Rule 33 as “tinkering changes,”
61
called for systemic reform.
2. The 1983 Amendments
Stung by this criticism, the Advisory Committee then went back to
work. The Supreme Court approved a new package of reforms in
1983 to combat abusive practices and tactical behavior in pleadings
and in motion practice, in pretrial discovery, and at pretrial
62
conferences by amending Rules 11, 16, and 26. Rule 11 was
strengthened to provide for mandatory sanctions against parties
63
engaged in abusive pleading practices. Rule 16 as amended gave the
judge more discretionary authority to manage the pretrial phase of the
case, and it empowered the court to sanction parties who did not
64
cooperate at pretrial conferences. Rule 26 as amended mandated
65
sanctions against parties engaged in abusive behavior on discovery.
The 1983 package represented a change in philosophy in dealing
with abuse in the pretrial phase of the case, inaugurating a “get tough”
policy and featuring an iron boot approach to effectuating attitudinal
changes among members of the bar. The courts had always had the
authority, both inherent and rule-based, to deal with abusive conduct
66
in the pretrial phase of litigation. Yet, the courts rarely invoked that
67
authority. Rule 11 had been notably underutilized. Moreover, courts
were reluctant to impose discovery sanctions, preferring instead to

61

See id. at 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting).
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THEIR ADVISORY NOTES
1–2 (1982), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules
/Reports/CV03-1982.pdf.
63 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
64 FED. R. CIV. P. 16.
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g).
66 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 258–59 (1975)
(recognizing inherent powers of courts to sanction parties who have acted vexatiously or in
bad faith); FED. R. CIV. P. 11, 37; see 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012); Edward D. Cavanagh,
Developing Standards Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
14 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 503–511 (1986) [hereinafter Cavanagh, Developing Standards]
(discussing courts’ ability to impose sanctions under the original Rule 11 and the amended
Rule 11); see generally Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) (determining that a
district court had the authority to impose sanctions for a party’s bad faith conduct);
Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 533 (1991)
(concluding that lower courts applied the correct standard when deciding a party’s
monetary sanctions).
67 See Cavanagh, Developing Standards, supra note 66, at 504–06.
62
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68

cajole the parties into compliance. The drafters concluded that this
approach had not worked and charted a new course for discovery
reform.
Even though the thrust of the 1983 Amendments was discovery
reform, Rule 11 quickly became the most frequently used tool in the
69
newly created sanctions arsenal. The number of reported cases
dealing with discovery sanctions has been far outstripped by the
70
volume of Rule 11 cases. Although the relative inactivity under
Rule 26(g) does not conclusively demonstrate that discovery abuse
has been eliminated, one can fairly assume that if discovery abuse
remained a significant problem after the 1983 Amendments took
effect, parties and the courts would have utilized Rule 26(g) sanctions
to a far greater extent than they have in fact. Accordingly, assertions
71
made subsequently—particularly by a Brookings Institute study
finding that discovery abuse remained a problem in the late 1980s—
are questionable.
3. The 1993 Amendments
The far-reaching changes implemented by the 1983 Amendments,
however, did not quell the cries for reform. Each of the three branches
of the federal government responded by the end of the decade.
72
Congress established the Federal Courts Study Committee in 1988.
Then-Senator Joe Biden and others introduced the Civil Justice
68 See Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery
Through Local Rules, 30 VILL. L. REV. 767, 774–76 (1985) [hereinafter Cavanagh, The
1983 Amendments].
69 Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990: Requiescat in Pace, 173
F.R.D. 565, 572 (1997) [hereinafter Cavanagh, Requiescat].
70 Id.
71 See BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COSTS AND DELAYS IN CIVIL
LITIGATION (1989) [hereinafter JUSTICE FOR ALL]. The Brookings Institute Task Force
was convened at Chairman Biden’s request. JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY,
AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT 1 (1996) [hereinafter THE RAND REPORT]. It included:
“leading litigators from the plaintiffs’ and defense bar, civil and women’s rights lawyers,
attorneys representing consumer and environmental organizations, representatives of the
insurance industry, general counsels of major corporations, former judges, and law
professors,” but no sitting judges. Id.
72 Federal Courts Study Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4644 (1990). The
Federal Courts Study Committee consisted of fifteen members named by the Chief Justice
and charged with addressing the perceived crises in the federal court system and reporting
to Congress on how to remedy that crisis.
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73

Reform Act (CJRA), a master plan for sweeping procedural reform
of the federal civil justice system; at the grass roots, it was aimed at
reducing unnecessary cost and delay in civil litigation and assuring
that the federal courts would be accessible to all litigants and not only
to those who are well-off financially.
74
Persuaded by two well-publicized studies that had concluded that
litigation in the federal courts was too costly and too slow, and
concerned that procedural reform efforts under the Rules Enabling
75
76
Act were “incremental and languid,” Congress adopted the CJRA,
which featured a “bottom-up” approach to reform that required each
federal district court to assess the specific causes of unnecessary cost
and delay within that district. Each district was then mandated to
design a plan to address these problems. In designing cost and delay
reduction plans, districts were encouraged to experiment and
innovate. Congress hoped that this process would generate creative
solutions locally that could then be implemented nationally.
At about the same time that the CJRA was being debated in
Congress, the Advisory Committee, which had already been revisiting
77
mandatory sanctions under Rule 11, also considered the desirability
of further discovery reform, including numerical limits on
interrogatories and depositions. The enactment of the CJRA not only
galvanized the Advisory Committee into action, but it also put the
Advisory Committee under considerable pressure to develop rules
that would be compatible with CJRA reform principles and, at the
78
same time, leave room for local experimentation. From this effort
73 Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 [CJRA], Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–82 (2012)).
74 See generally JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 71; HUMPHREY TAYLOR & GARY L.
SCHMERMUND, PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A STUDY
CONDUCTED FOR THE FOUNDATION FOR CHANGE, INC. (1989), reprinted in The Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990: Hearings Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 91–184 (1990); R. Lawrence Dessem, Judicial
Reporting Under the Civil Justice Reform Act: Look, Mom, No Cases!, 54 U. PITT. L. REV.
687, 689 n.13 (1993).
75 Jeffrey J. Peck, “Users United”: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 107–09 (1992).
76 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101-650, tit. I, 104 Stat. 5089 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 471).
77 Comm. on Rules of Prac. and Proc. of the Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Call for Written
Comments on Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules (Aug.
1990), reprinted in 131 F.R.D. 335 (1990).
78 Paul D. Carrington, Renovating Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REV. 51, 58 (“[T]he 1993
revision of the discovery rules authorizing local variations was put forward by the Civil
Rules Committee of that time in the belief that authority for local rules was needed if
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emerged the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The 1993 Amendments had two prominent features. First, they
abolished mandatory sanctions under Rule 11 and left the issue to the
79
trial court’s discretion. The Advisory Committee was concerned
that Rule 11 sanctions had become routine, and that the threat of
80
mandatory sanctions had a chilling effect on meritorious claims.
Second, the 1993 Amendments further refined the discovery
process by (1) mandating automatic disclosure (production without
81
82
83
prior request) of certain facts, expert testimony, trial evidence,
84
and the identity of witnesses; (2) presumptive limits on the number
85
86
of interrogatories (twenty-five) and depositions (ten per side); (3)
requiring counsel to meet and confer to develop a discovery plan prior
87
to the commencement of discovery; and (4) mandating a pre88
discovery conference with the court. These Amendments took effect
89
nearly three years after the enactment of the CJRA; and, in some
cases, the new national rules were at odds with cost-reduction plans
90
adopted by district courts pursuant to the CJRA.
To avoid
inconsistencies with the CJRA plans, the 1993 Amendments
authorized local district courts to opt out of the new discovery
91
standards, and more than half of the federal courts elected to do so.
discovery variations were to be legitimately included in local plans promulgated under the
CJRA.”).
79 FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
80 See supra note 68.
81 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(2).
83 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3).
84 Id.
85 FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).
86 FED. R. CIV. P. 30(a)(2)(A).
87 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
88 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b).
89 See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 [CJRA], Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089
(codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 471–482 (2012)).
90 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1).
91 DONNA STIENSTRA, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPLEMENTATION OF DISCLOSURE IN
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, WITH SPECIFIC ATTENTION TO COURTS’ RESPONSES TO
SELECTED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 26, at 6 (1994)
(“Altogether, 52 courts have exempted cases from the requirements of Rule 26(a)(1). Of
these, however, sixteen require disclosure through local rules or orders or the CJRA plan,
and thirteen specifically give individual judges authority to require initial disclosure.”); see
generally Cavanagh, Requiescat, supra note 69, at 591.
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Mandatory automatic disclosure was easily the most controversial
feature of the 1993 discovery amendments. Voluntary disclosure of
information—the exchange of relevant materials without the necessity
of a formal discovery request—is a laudable goal and, if implemented
widely, would likely achieve significant savings during the discovery
phase of a case. At the same time, it is pure Pollyanna to think that, in
the real world of federal litigation at this point in time, voluntary
disclosure could lessen significantly the need for formal discovery.
Voluntary disclosure runs contrary to many lawyers’ instincts. The
trial of a civil case in federal court is an adversary process. So too is
the pretrial phase of the case. It is hard enough to get parties to turn
over information, especially prejudicial information, when
specifically requested on discovery. Accordingly, it is naïve to think
that parties would be willing to exchange this information voluntarily.
It is especially naïve for Congress to offer this vehicle as a costsavings device when a principal concern of the Brookings Institute
study was discovery abuse.92
The futility of mandatory automatic disclosure is further illustrated
by the failure of mandatory automatic disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to gain any significant
following.93 Perhaps no amendment to the Federal Rules has been as
vilified as mandatory automatic disclosure.94 As noted above, a
significant number of district courts rejected mandatory automatic
95
disclosure outright. Mandatory automatic disclosure has not caught
on with the profession, and indeed it has continued to engender
96
criticism long after its adoption in 1993. It has been reduced to a

92

See JUSTICE FOR ALL, supra note 71.
See STIENSTRA, supra note 91.
94 Compare George F. Hritz, Plan Will Increase Cost, Delay Outcomes, N.Y. L.J., Apr.
13, 1993, at 2 (predicting that automatic disclosure will prove costly and inefficient), and
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery—The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L.
REV. 1 (1992) (questioning viability of mandatory disclosure), and Laura A. Kaster &
Kenneth A. Wittenberg, Rulemakers Should Be Litigators, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 17, 1992, at
15 (commenting that mandatory disclosure impinges on work product and attorney/client
protections), with Charles P. Sifton, Experiment a Bold and Thoughtful Step, N.Y. L.J.,
Apr. 13, 1993, at 3 (noting that automatic disclosure in most cases will make civil
discovery less adversarial), and Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 263, 267 (arguing that mandatory disclosure amendments to Rule 26 will
reduce costs and delay).
95 See supra note 91.
96 See Carl Tobias, Congress and the 2000 Federal Civil Rules Amendments, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 75, 76 (2000) (“Practically all elements of the organized bar
vociferously criticized the suggestions for automatic disclosure”).
93
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nonevent. If mandatory automatic disclosure has failed, then a
fortiori, voluntary disclosure is doomed to failure.
4. The 2000 Amendments
On January 28, 1997, the RAND Corporation—which had been
commissioned by the Judicial Conference of the United States
pursuant to the CJRA to conduct an empirical study of the efficacy of
97
the CJRA reforms—released its final report. The RAND study
concluded that, as implemented, the package of reforms embodied in
the CJRA had had no real impact on the “time to disposition,
litigation costs, and attorney’s satisfaction and views of the fairness of
98
case management.” The RAND study further concluded that neither
mandatory automatic disclosure nor voluntary disclosure had had any
99
meaningful impact in reducing costs and delays in litigation. The
RAND study suggested that courts could best limit excessive cost and
delay by setting and adhering to strict deadlines for the completion of
100
discovery and the commencement of trial.
Congress mercifully allowed the CJRA to sunset on December 31,
101
1997, as prescribed by the statute itself. The CJRA’s death set the
stage for the next phase of discovery reform. In 2000, the Federal
Rules introduced further restrictions on discovery depositions by
102
presumptively limiting a deposition to one seven-hour day.
The
new rules also significantly trimmed back the mandatory automatic
disclosure obligations under Rule 26(a). The 2000 amendments
require disclosure of: (1) the identity of the witnesses and documents
that a party will use to support its claim or defense, (2) the identity of
retained testifying experts, and (3) the identity of evidence that a party
97 See THE RAND REPORT, supra note 71. The foregoing report is actually an executive
summary of three technical reports comprising RAND’s analysis of the CJRA. Id. at v.
Prepared for the Judicial Conference, the RAND Report “provides an overview of the
purpose of the CJRA, the basic design of the evaluation, the key findings, and their policy
implications.” Id. The three technical reports are: JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL.,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON
DISTRICTS (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE
MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET
AL., AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996).
98 THE RAND REPORT, supra note 71, at 1.
99
Id. at 16–17.
100 Id. at 1–2.
101 See Pub. L. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5090, § 103(b)(2) (1990).
102 See FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1).
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103

contemplates using at trial. In addition, the Federal Rules, for the
most part, no longer allow individual districts to opt out by local
104
rule.
In perhaps the most far-reaching change ever made by the
Advisory Committee, the 2000 Amendments significantly narrowed
the scope of discovery from “relevant to the subject matter” to
105
“relevant to any party’s claim or defense.” Nevertheless, if a party
finds that discovery is inadequate under the “relevant to any party’s
claim or defense” standard, that party can then seek court permission
to obtain discovery of materials “relevant to the subject matter” of the
106
The upshot of the amended rule is that discovery is
litigation.
presumptively limited to matters relevant to a claim or defense, and
only upon a showing to the court that such discovery is inadequate
107
can additional discovery be obtained.
5. The 2006 Amendments
In 2006, in recognition of the enormous importance of information
stored on electronic media, the Advisory Committee adopted rules
dealing specifically with electronically stored information. The
amendments clarify that electronically stored information is
108
equivalent to the paper document stored in hard copy. The Federal
Rules direct parties to address issues relating to electronically stored
information during the discovery planning process and that pretrial
scheduling orders include provisions for discovery of electronically
109
stored information.
The Federal Rules also contained detailed
provisions for sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests
110
for electronically stored information. However, the rules leave it up

103

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)–(3).
See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT ON THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 47 (1999) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules
/Reports/CV05-1999.pdf (“[The 2000 Amendments] narrow the initial disclosure
obligation and remove the previous authority to ‘opt out’ of this requirement by local
rule.”).
105 See id. at 5–6; FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
106 See REPORT ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 104, at 5–6; FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b)(1) (“For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action.”).
107 See REPORT ON THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, supra note 104, at 48.
108 FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)(A).
109 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(iii), 26(f)(3)(C).
110 FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f).
104
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to the courts to determine any limitations on discovery of
111
electronically stored information on a case-by-case basis.
6. The Proposed 2015 Amendments
The Advisory Committee has proposed a series of rule changes that
are designed to promote early and effective judicial case management
by (1) accelerating the timeframe for filing complaints and issuing
scheduling orders; (2) directing that scheduling conferences be
conducted in person or through simultaneous communication, thereby
eliminating scheduling conferences by mail; (3) mandating that
scheduling orders address subjects, including (a) preservation of
electronically stored documents, (b) agreements to prevent waiver of
privilege or work product under Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence, and (c) pre-motion conferences in which the court is asked
to intervene in discovery matters; (4) adding two items to the
discovery plan under Rule 26(f): the preservation of electronically
stored information and agreements to protect against waiver of
privilege or work product under Rule 502 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence; and (5) modifying the existing discovery timeline to permit
filing Rule 34 document requests prior to the Rule 26(f) discovery
112
conference.
a. Timing of Complaint and Scheduling Order
The Advisory Committee is of the view that early stages of
113
litigation take too long, thereby adding to the cost of litigation.
Accordingly, the proposed amendments shorten the time in which to
111 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2), 16(b). The Advisory Committee note to Rule 26 suggests
that a judge consider the following factors in determining whether to allow discovery of
electronically stored information:
(1) the specificity of the discovery request; (2) the quantity of information
available from other and more easily accessed sources; (3) the failure to produce
relevant information that seems likely to have existed but is no longer available
on more easily accessed sources; (4) the likelihood of finding relevant,
responsive information that cannot be obtained from other, more easily accessed
sources; (5) predictions as to the importance and usefulness of the further
information; (6) the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the
parties’ resources.
112 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT ON THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 4–6, 18–19, 22–23 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 ADVISORY
COMMITTEE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies
/rules/Reports/CV05-2013.pdf.
113 Id. at 4.
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serve a complaint from 120 days to 60 days from the date of filing.
The proposed amendments also reduce the time for issuing a
scheduling order from 120 days after a defendant has been served or
90 days after a defendant has appeared, to 90 days and 60 days,
115
respectively.
b. Scheduling Conferences
The Advisory Committee is of the view that scheduling
conferences are most effective if parties engage, via telephone or
116
Accordingly, the
through “more sophisticated electronic means.”
current authorization to conduct scheduling conferences by mail is
117
abrogated.
c. Additional Topics for Scheduling Orders
Authorizing scheduling orders to provide for preservation of
electronically stored information, and to include agreements to
prevent waiver of privilege and work product, are intended to remind
litigants that these are useful topics to discuss and agree upon at the
118
outset of litigation.
The proposed rule authorizing pre-motion
conferences on discovery issues was added in light of the experience
of many judges who find that such conferences can resolve disputes
informally without the need for formal briefs, thereby saving the
119
litigants, and the courts, both time and money.
The question of
whether to require such promotion conferences falls within the
120
judge’s discretion.
d. Content of Discovery Plans
Consistent with the above-discussed proposals affecting the content
of scheduling orders under proposed Rule 16(b)(3), discovery plans
may include provisions for the preservation of electronically stored
information and court orders on agreements under Rule 502 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to prevent waiver of privilege and attorney
121
work product.
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121

Id. at 4, 17 (Proposed Rule 4(m)).
Id. at 18–19 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(2)).
Id.
Id. at 18 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(1)).
Id. at 7 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(3)).
Id. at 7–8 (Proposed Rule 16(b)(3)(v)).
Id. at 8.
Id. at 19 (Proposed Rules 16(b)(3)(B), 26(f)(3)(C)–(D)).
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e. Accelerating the Timing of Document Requests
By relaxing the discovery moratorium to permit document requests
prior to the entry of a Rule 26(f) discovery plan, the Advisory
Committee intended to promote focused discussion of those document
122
This procedure would
demands during the discovery conference.
assist with early discovery planning and also allow concrete disputes
over the scope of discovery to be brought before the court at the
123
outset of the litigation. The Advisory Committee hopes to promote
discussions regarding document requests at discovery conferences so
124
that parties resolve more disputes without judicial intervention.
7. Summary
Unquestionably, the Advisory Committee on Federal Civil Rules
has recognized the changing face of federal civil litigation, especially
the mounting costs and increased complexity of modern cases. The
Advisory Committee also has always been at the forefront of the
debate about how to address these issues. Its response has generally
been deliberate and incremental, reflecting a strong faith in the
wisdom of the rules as initially promulgated. For example, the
Advisory Committee for years resisted limiting the scope of discovery
125
and imposing numerical limits on interrogatories and depositions.
Yet, the rules, notably the rules governing discovery, have changed
significantly since 1938. No longer can parties pursue a “scorched
earth” or “no stone unturned” discovery agenda. Discovery must be
proportional to the needs of the case. Interrogatories and depositions
are subject to presumptive limitations. Trial courts have broad powers
to manage discovery and to thereby rein in unnecessary costs and
delays. Nevertheless, not all litigants were thrilled with the actions of
the Advisory Committee, and they turned directly to the courts to
achieve change.
B. The Courts
The Supreme Court has been notably active in effectuating
procedural reforms in two areas: summary judgment and pleading
standards. At the summary judgment stage, trial courts must
122
123
124
125

Id. at 8–9 (Proposed Rule 26(d)(2)).
Id.
See id.
Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 107.
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thoroughly assess the evidence developed on discovery to assure that
the parties have presented genuine issues of fact for juries to decide.
Similarly, the High Court has directed trial judges to carefully
scrutinize complaints at the motion to dismiss stage to satisfy
themselves that the claims asserted warrant the costs of discovery.
1. Summary Judgment
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party is entitled to summary judgment if it can show that, based on the
pleadings and all materials properly before the court, there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact, and that the movant is entitled
126
to judgment as a matter of law. The summary judgment procedure
has always been part of the Federal Rules; yet, in its early years, Rule
127
56 was underutilized.
This was due, in part, to the perception
among some judges that granting summary judgment would somehow
short circuit the litigants’ rights to their day in court, a fundamental
128
goal of the Federal Rules.
In addition, there was concern that
summary judgment was simply inappropriate in certain kinds of
cases, such as antitrust cases. The Supreme Court’s decision in Poller
129
v. CBS, Inc. is instructive here.
In Poller, the Court denied
defendant’s summary judgment motion, holding that “summary
procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation
where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the
hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the
130
plot.”
Some observers viewed Poller as effectively reading
131
summary judgment out of antitrust cases, even though the Supreme
Court subsequently—and explicitly—rejected that notion shortly after
132
Poller came down.
Added to the ambiguity of the Poller holding was the ambiguity of
Rule 56 itself. The rule did not define “genuine issue” or “material
126

FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
See 11 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 56App.101[3]
(3d ed. 1999) (noting a general sense that summary judgment was “extremely difficult to
obtain”).
128 See Hamilton v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 961 F.2d 1495, 1504 (10th Cir.
1992) (expressing concern that summary judgment may hinder plaintiff’s ability to fully
present its case).
129 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
130 Id. at 473.
131 See EDWARD BRUNET & MARTIN H. REDISH, SUMMARY JUDGMENT: FEDERAL
LAW AND PRACTICE § 9:3, at 309–10 (3d ed. 2006).
132 See First Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288–90 (1968).
127
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133

fact.”
It was unclear who had the burden of proof on a summary
judgment motion—whether that burden paralleled the burdens at trial
134
and how that burden was met on the motion. In the face of these
uncertainties, courts understandably were hesitant to grant summary
judgment. That, in turn, caused defendants to lose faith in the
supervisory powers of the courts and their will to dismiss infirm cases
135
prior to trial.
All of that changed in the spring of 1986, when the Supreme Court
handed down three decisions that clarified and revitalized summary
judgment procedures.
a. Matsushita
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,
Zenith, an American electronics firm, sued rival Japanese electronics
manufacturers alleging, inter alia, that the Japanese sellers had
conspired to drive Zenith from the field by agreeing to engage in
136
predatory pricing, that is, selling below their costs. The defendants
137
moved for summary judgment.
Matsushita presented significant
substantive and procedural issues. Substantively, the question was
whether a predatory pricing scheme is even a plausible competitive
138
tactic.
The theory of a predatory pricing claim is that a dominant
seller or group of sellers with deep pockets can drive targeted rivals
139
Deep pocket predators can
out of business by selling at a loss.
140
withstand short-term losses better than the target.
Once the target
has exited the field, the dominant seller has the market to itself, can
reap monopoly profits, and can recoup any short-term losses suffered
141
while the scheme was in place.

133 See Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded
Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive Rules of Civil Procedure,
137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2097 (1989).
134 See id. at 2100–01, 2100 n.168.
135 See id. at 2097 (“Rule 56 has been enfeebled by courts reluctant to take
responsibility for assessing the genuineness of contentions.”).
136 475 U.S. 574, 577–78 (1986).
137 Id. at 578.
138 Id. at 588–90.
139 See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 117 (1986).
140 See id.
141 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588–89.
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In the real world, however, a predatory pricing strategy is very
142
risky and simply does not make rational business sense.
First, for
the scheme to succeed, the predator must incur losses in the short
143
term. This would be anathema for most companies, which operate
144
A predatory pricing scheme is not like
on a for-profit model.
selling at low profit margins in which large volume would yield large
145
profits.
In a predatory pricing scenario, every sale exacerbates
losses. Simply put, a predator does not “make it up on volume.”
Second, assuming the dubious proposition that a company is
willing to incur losses to force out a rival, it is not clear how long
losses would have to be incurred before the target exited the field. In
Matsushita, the scheme was allegedly in place for more than twenty
146
years and still had not brought Zenith to its knees. Few companies
would commit to open-ended losses in the hope that sooner or later a
rival would capitulate.
Third, even if the defendants could successfully drive Zenith from
the field, there is no guarantee that a new company would not arise
147
from the ashes and emerge as a viable rival.
In that case, the
process of selling at a loss would begin anew. Given the inherent risks
of a predatory pricing scheme, rational sellers would be hesitant to
embrace it as a plausible business strategy.
In addition to these substantive issues, Matsushita raised
significant procedural issues. Did Zenith present sufficient evidence
to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat the
summary judgment motion? Zenith’s only real evidence of agreement
148
was that defendants sold at low prices.
That evidence was at best
149
It may be that defendants had conspired to set low
ambiguous.
prices. However, an equally plausible explanation of defendants’
150
conduct was that they were aggressively competing for sales. The
151
low prices spurred competition and benefitted consumers. In other
142

Id.
Id. at 588.
144 See id.
145 See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 118 (“price cutting [is] aimed simply at increasing market
share”).
146 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 592.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 594.
149 See id. (“But cutting prices in order to increase business often is the very essence of
competition.”).
150 See id.
151 See id.
143
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words, defendants’ conduct was arguably consistent with the antitrust
laws.
The Supreme Court concluded that Zenith had failed to create a
genuine issue of material fact; this is, it failed to adduce sufficient
evidence to raise a question about which reasonable people could
152
disagree.
The Court ruled that the range of inferences that can be
drawn from ambiguous evidence on a motion for summary judgment
153
Conduct that is as consistent with competition as it is
is limited.
with an antitrust violation is insufficient as a matter of law to create a
154
jury question.
In such a situation, a plaintiff must come forward
155
with additional evidence to defeat the summary judgment motion.
A plaintiff must present evidence that “tends to exclude the possibility
156
that the alleged conspirators acted independently.”
The plaintiff
must show “the inference of conspiracy is reasonable in light of the
competing inferences of independent action or collusive action that
157
could not have harmed [plaintiff].”
Matsushita put to rest any notion that summary judgment is
inappropriate in antitrust cases. Rule 56 applies equally to all actions
in federal court. Matsushita also made clear that the standards for
summary judgment and for judgment as a matter of law are one in the
158
same.
Finally, Matsushita made clear that to defeat a summary
judgment motion, a plaintiff must do more than raise “metaphysical
159
doubt”;
rather, it must adduce evidence about which reasonable
persons could disagree.
b. Celotex
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, an asbestos case, defendant moved for
summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff had failed to adduce
evidence that exposure to defendant’s asbestos products was the
152 Id. at 596–97 (“if [as here] petitioners had no rational economic motive to conspire,
and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct
does not give rise to an inference of conspiracy” (citation omitted)).
153 See id. at 588 (citation omitted).
154 Id. (citation omitted).
155 Id. (citation omitted).
156 Id. (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
157 Id. (citation omitted).
158 See id. The term “judgment as a matter of law” replaced “directed verdict” in the
1991 Amendments to Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FED. R. CIV. P. 50
advisory committee’s note.
159 Id. at 586 (citation omitted).
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proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries, an element of plaintiff’s claim
160
upon which she would bear the burden of proof at trial. The Court
of Appeals ruled that defendant, having failed to introduce evidence
tending to negate any exposure, was not entitled to judgment as a
161
matter of law.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that summary judgment was
proper because plaintiff failed to show the existence of an element
162
Such a
essential to which she had the burden of proof at trial.
complete failure of proof with respect to an essential element of the
163
case renders all other facts in the case immaterial. The Court also
made clear that summary judgment “is properly regarded not as a
disfavored procedural shortcut, but rather as an integral part of the
Federal Rules as a whole, which are designed ‘to secure the just,
164
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.’”
c. Anderson
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. was a defamation action by a
165
“citizen’s lobby” against a magazine. The Supreme Court held that
the standard of proof on a motion for summary judgment must mirror
166
Here, to succeed at trial, plaintiff
the standard of proof at trial.
would have to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, malice on the
167
part of the defendant.
Because the Court of Appeals applied the
wrong standard, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.
The 1986 trilogy was a clear signal from the Supreme Court that
the summary judgment procedure was an integral part of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, and that where the Rule 56 standards are
met, courts should not hesitate to grant summary judgment.
2. Pleading Standards
The Federal Rules incorporated the common law demurrer, which
allowed the defendant to test the legal sufficiency of the pleadings at

160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167

477 U.S. 317, 319–20 (1986).
Id. at 321.
Id. at 322–23.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 327 (citation omitted).
477 U.S. 242, 244–45 (1986).
Id. at 252.
Id. at 257.
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168

the outset of a case.
Accordingly, the Federal Rules permit
judgment as a matter of law in cases in which the complaint fails to
169
state a claim upon which relief may be granted. But, what does that
language mean? As a threshold matter, the drafters of the Federal
Rules purposefully chose that language over the formulation of failure
to state a cause of action used in the codes and in common law
170
pleading jurisdictions.
The Federal Rules eschewed the notion,
adopted by the codes and by the common law, that a complaint must
171
assert all elements of a cause of action. Rather, the Federal Rules
required only facts sufficient to put the defendant on notice of the
172
claim.
In Conley v. Gibson, decided some twenty years after the
promulgation of the Federal Rules, the Supreme Court held that “a
complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
173
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” The Court
went on to explain that Rule 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint “give
the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff’s claim is and the
174
grounds upon which it rests.” The “no set of facts” language sets a
high bar for defendants seeking to dismiss a complaint on a Rule
12(b)(6) motion. Taken literally, the language of Conley would vitiate
almost all motions to dismiss.
Notwithstanding the demanding standards of Conley, many trial
courts granted motions to dismiss. However, enough courts balked at
motions to dismiss on Conley grounds to cause concern among
defendants who felt that under Conley, paper-thin complaints could
license expensive discovery, which would leave defendants with no
choice but to pay to settle the matter, irrespective of the merits of

168 See Charles E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 194–95
(1957–58); FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
169 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
170 See Clark, supra note 168, at 187; see also Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to
Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J.
1, 23–24 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Double Play] (The Federal Rules “substitut[e] ‘short
and plain’ and ‘claim for relief’ for any reference to the troublesome code categories of
‘facts,’ ‘conclusions,’ ‘evidence,’ and ‘cause of action.’”); see generally WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 7, §§ 1215–1216.
171 See Clark, supra note 168, at 186–87.
172 See id.
173 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957).
174 Id. at 47.
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plaintiffs’ claim.
Efforts to engage the Advisory Committee on
Rule 12(b)(6) standards failed, and so defendants turned to the courts.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme Court revisited the
concept of notice pleading, the proper construction of Rule 8(a)(2),
176
Twombly was a putative
and the continuing viability of Conley.
class action antitrust suit by subscribers of local telephone services
177
and high-speed Internet access in the New York City area.
Plaintiffs alleged that defendants—the four providers of local
telephone services in the United States—had violated section one of
the Sherman Act by conspiring (1) not to provide interconnect
services to new entrants in the local telephone market as required by
the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and (2) not to compete with
178
each other in what heretofore had been exclusive territories.
Although the complaint alleged that the defendants’ conduct was
the result of a conspiracy, it contained no factual allegations of
179
agreement.
That is, the complaint did not set forth the times and
places of any conspiratorial meetings, the participants therein, or the
180
contents of any agreement.
Rather, the plaintiffs claimed that
conspiracy could be inferred from the fact that defendants had
declined to compete in each other’s territories, and that at least one
defendant had frustrated entry into the local telephone market by
refusing to cooperate in providing interconnect services with the
181
prospective new entrant.
Defendants countered that in the absence of factual allegations of
agreement, the complaint, at best, alleged conscious parallelism
182
among the defendants.
As a matter of substantive antitrust
principles, conscious parallelism is not enough to make out a
183
violation of section one of the Sherman Act.
Given that the
plaintiffs had failed properly to allege conspiracy, the defendants
184
were entitled to judgment as a matter of law and were not forced to

175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184

See Miller, Double Play, supra note 170, at 8–9, 14.
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
Id. at 550–51.
Id.
See id. at 551.
Id. at 551–52 n.2.
See id. at 550–51.
See id. at 552.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 570.
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bear the expense of discovery and the related burdens of antitrust
litigation.
In dismissing the complaint, the Supreme Court took the
185
opportunity to revisit pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2).
The Court acknowledged that the Federal Rules had relaxed pleading
standards from the stringent demands under the codes and at common
186
law.
Yet, the Court pointed out that it would be a mistake to
“suggest[] that the Federal Rules somehow dispensed with the
187
pleading of facts altogether.”
Rather, the Federal Rules simply
relieved the plaintiff of the obligation of setting forth the claim in
188
detail in the pleadings.
189
A plaintiff must make a “showing” that it is “entitled” to relief.
This involves “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
190
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
To
survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state a claim that is
“plausible”; that is, it must provide “enough fact to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal
191
[conduct].”
Accordingly, “an allegation of parallel conduct and a
192
bare assertion of conspiracy will not suffice.”
Of greater interest is the Court’s rationale in Twombly. A principal
objective of Twombly’s heightened pleading standard was to stem the
high cost of discovery. The Court admonished trial courts not “to
forget that proceeding to antitrust discovery can be expensive” and
also observed that high discovery costs may force defendants to settle
matters early on the litigation timeline, irrespective of the merits of
193
the plaintiff’s claim.
The Court further opined that tools
traditionally used to identify and eliminate infirm claims—case
management, supervised discovery, summary judgment, and jury
instructions—simply do not work, relying on Judge Easterbrook’s
observations in a 1989 law review comment that courts are powerless

185
186
187
188
189
190
191
192
193

Id. at 554–62.
See id. at 555 n.3.
Id.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 555, 557.
Id. at 555.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id. at 558–59.
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to control the claims presented in a case and to control the costs of
194
discovery.
In so ruling the Court ignored the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
and particularly the 1983, 1993, and 2000 Amendments, which, as
discussed above, conferred broad managerial powers on federal
195
judges.
It is simply not possible that the Court in 2007 was
unaware of these developments, nor is it likely that the Court was
ignorant of empirical research demonstrating that discovery abuse
leading to excessive trial preparation costs was not a problem in the
196
vast majority of cases litigated in the federal courts.
The salient question is why the Court ruled as it did in Twombly.
The Twombly ruling was a marked departure from the decision in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County a decade earlier in which the Court
stated unequivocally that pleading was a matter for the Advisory
Committee, not the courts:
Perhaps if Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today, claims against
municipalities under § 1983 might be subjected to the added
specificity requirement of Rule 9(b). But that is a result which must
be obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not
by judicial interpretation. In the absence of such an amendment,
federal courts and litigants must rely on summary judgment and
control of 197
discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather
than later.

Moreover, it is undeniable that the Court’s rejection of Leatherman
was purposeful:
It is no answer to say that a claim just shy of a plausible
entitlement to relief can, if groundless, be weeded out early in the
discovery process through “careful case management,” . . . given
the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side. See, e.g.,
Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B. U. L. Rev. 635, 638 (1989)
(“Judges can do little about impositional discovery when parties
control the legal claims to be presented and conduct the discovery
themselves”). And it is self-evident that the problem of discovery
abuse cannot be solved by “careful scrutiny of evidence at the
summary judgment stage,” much less “lucid instructions to
194 Id. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635
(1989)).
195 See supra Part II.B.2.–4.
196 See Edward D. Cavanagh, Twombly: The Demise of Notice Pleading, the Triumph
of Milton Handler, and the Uncertain Future of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 28 REV.
LITIG. 1, 24–25 (2008).
197 Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S.
163, 168–69 (1993).
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juries”[;] . . . the threat of discovery expense will push costconscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching
those proceedings. Probably, then, it is only by taking care to
require allegations that reach the level suggesting conspiracy that
we can hope to avoid the potentially enormous expense of discovery
in cases with no “‘reasonably founded hope that the [discovery]
198
process will reveal relevant evidence’” to support a § 1 claim.

If excessive discovery costs are truly the problem that the Court
seeks to address, perhaps the better solution is to incentivize district
courts to enforce the discovery limitations authorized by the Federal
Rules. The Court cited no post-1989 case law or data on the efficacy
of discovery limitations, which is really the relevant timeframe here.
In any event, the Court’s decision that the appropriate way to address
the problem of excessive discovery costs—dismissing suspect claims
at the outset of the litigation—seems counterintuitive. The parties and
the court know the least about the respective claims and defenses at
the motion to dismiss stage. Still, the Court opted for the most drastic
remedy, dismissal prior to discovery. This approach undermines a
199
basic premise of discovery—equal access to proof —and thereby
puts antitrust plaintiffs at a severe disadvantage; defendants have
exclusive control of all evidence of conspiracy and overt acts in
furtherance thereof. This approach also puts antitrust plaintiffs in a
catch-twenty-two situation: they must plead facts showing conspiracy,
but they are denied access to discovery of those facts through the
preemptive motion to dismiss.
Twombly has been the subject of much discussion since the day it
200
was decided.
However, the decision has turned out not to be the
scourge that its critics feared. Empirical studies reveal only a modest
201
uptick in the granting of motions to dismiss.
Nevertheless, the
question remains as to whether such a far-reaching change in pleading
standards was a matter for the courts, or whether any changes should
198

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559 (alteration in original).
See Miller, supra note 2, at 289.
200 See, e.g., Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 103.
201 See JOE S. CECIL ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL, at vii (2011), available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf
.nsf/lookup/motioniqbal.pdf/$file/motioniqbal.pdf; see also Memorandum from Andrea
Kuperman, Rules Law Clerk to Judge Lee H. Rosenthal, to Civil Rules Committee and
Standing Rules Committee 4 (Dec. 15, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Iqbal_memo_121510.pdf (“[C]ase law to date does not
appear to indicate that Iqbal has dramatically changed the application of the standards used
to determine pleading sufficiency.”).
199
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have been left to the rulemaking process. Federal courts have the
power to interpret the Federal Rules but no power to amend them.
Some commentators have argued that Twombly improperly crossed
202
the line into rulemaking. Twombly is surely close to the line, if not
crossing the line. Indeed Twombly went much further than
Matsushita. In Matsushita, the Court merely construed the term
“genuine issue of material fact” in Rule 56(c) in order to determine
whether summary judgment should have been entered on the record
203
before the Court.
Twombly, on the other hand, enunciated a new
pleading standard that raised the bar for plaintiffs to get by a motion
204
to dismiss and to be in a position to make discovery demands.
Nevertheless, the fact that the Advisory Committee has not proposed
any rulemaking in response to Twombly suggests that it does not view
the Court in Twombly as having usurped the rulemaking function,
rendering criticism of Twombly on that basis moot.
C. Opting Out of the Court System
A third response to the perceived problems with inadequacies of
the Federal Rules has been for litigants to flee the federal court
system in favor of (1) forums outside the United States and (2)
arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution (ADR)
205
mechanisms.
1. Flight to Foreign Forums
In our increasingly globalized economy, more and more foreign
firms and individuals find themselves subject to the jurisdiction of
United States law, which differs both substantively and procedurally
from the laws of their home nations. Private rights of action,
mandatory treble damages, class actions, pretrial discovery, and jury
trials—common features of the American system—are unknown in
many foreign jurisdictions. The jury system is particularly
202 See Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 621, 648, 656 (2010) (criticizing the Supreme Court’s
disregard for the rulemaking process).
203 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586–88
(1986).
204 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007).
205 See, e.g., Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States, NAFTA Arb. Trib., Decision on
Parties’ Requests for Production of Documents Withheld on Grounds of Privilege ¶ 20 n.1
(Nov. 17, 2005) (“[T]he Tribunal recognize[d] that it is generally understood that one
reason parties choose arbitration is to avoid the relatively expensive document production
practices of courts generally and United States courts in particular.”).
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dumbfounding for those who come from civil law regimes. The
notion of having a legal dispute resolved by six persons—chosen by
lot, unaffiliated with any of the parties, who know nothing about the
facts (other than what they hear in court), and nothing about the law
(other than what the judge tells them)—is troubling and very risky.
Not surprisingly, foreign firms seek to minimize these and other
perceived risks by avoiding American courts and American law
206
through forum selection and choice of law clauses. The courts have
207
generally upheld these clauses.
2. Alterative Dispute Resolution
ADR procedures—including arbitration, mediation, neutral
evaluation, mini-trials, and summary jury trials—have thrived in the
last three decades in large part because they have been viewed as
208
faster and more economical than the courts for resolving disputes.
These mechanisms typically permit the parties to control the amount
and cost of discovery, the length of any hearing, the number of
209
witnesses to testify, and even the identity of the finder(s) of fact.
ADR is also private, and thus it allows parties to preserve business
relationships, permits them to adopt innovative remedial techniques,
210
and shields any dispute from public scrutiny.
Additionally, ADR

206 See Jeffery B. Struckhoff, The Irony of Uberrimae Fidei: Bad Faith Practices in
Marine Insurance, 29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 287, 303–08 (2005); see also Asa Markel,
American, English and Japanese Warranty Law Compared: Should the U.S. Reconsider
Her Article 95 Declaration to the CISG?, 21 PACE INT’L L. REV. 163, 174 (2009) (noting
that international commercial entities go to great lengths to avoid American courts); see
also Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1133–35 (1996) (“foreigners are reluctant to litigate in America for a
variety of reasons”).
207 See Atlantic Marine Constr. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the W. Dist. of Tex.,
134 S. Ct. 568, 579–80 (2013) (enforcing forum selection clause); Bremen v. Zapata OffShore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 10 (1972) (Forum selection clauses are “prima facie valid and
should be enforced unless enforcement is shown by the resisting party to be ‘unreasonable’
under the circumstances.”).
208 See Virginia Knapp Dorell, Picturing a Remedy for Small Claims of Copyright
Infringement, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 449, 461 (2013) (“An ADR process shares some of the
benefits of an administrative proceeding, including lower costs, faster resolution of cases
and an easing of the federal courts’ workload.”).
209 See David R. Cleveland, Post-Crisis Reconsideration of Federal Court Reform, 61
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 47, 88 (2013); Michael J. Wolf, Collaborative Technology Improves
Access to Justice, 15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 773–74 (2012).
210 Cleveland, supra note 209, at 88; Wolf, supra note 209, at 773–74; see Kristin L.
Fortin, Reviving the Lawyer’s Role as Servant Leader: The Professional Paradigm and a

CAVANAGH (DO NOT DELETE)

666

3/24/2015 10:33 AM

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93, 631

arrangements can limit damage exposure and effectively insulate
parties from substantive liability. Consequently, the Supreme Court
211
That, in
has upheld arbitration provisions banning class actions.
turn, would effectively immunize the defendant from antitrust claims
when the damages per individual plaintiff are nominal, even if the
damages in the aggregate are substantial. Finally, ADR mechanisms
offer hope for civility in resolving disputes which many parties prefer
over the contentiousness that characterizes much of today’s
212
litigation.
The principal downside of ADR for users is that the right to appeal
most decisions rendered in ADR proceedings is “severely
213
restricted.”
There are also significant public interest concerns,
including lack of public scrutiny, due process protections, systematic
reporting, stare decisis, and procedure protections—including
214
limitations on the rules of discovery and rules of evidence.
3. Court-Annexed ADR
The popularity and success of ADR have not gone unnoticed by the
courts. Many courts have embraced ADR and brought it into the
215
judicial system through various court-annexed ADR programs.
Oftentimes, these programs involve certain classes of cases that are
referred in the first instance to a court-appointed mediator who meets
216
with the parties and proposes a resolution. The mediator’s proposal
Lawyer’s Ethical Obligation to Inform Clients About Alternative Dispute Resolution, 22
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 589, 618 (2009).
ADR ensures the most cost-effective, timely, and conciliatory resolution of
disputes and produces: heightened public satisfaction with the justice system;
creative resolutions where parties have more autonomy and control over the
outcome; voluntary compliance with agreements; speedy and generally amicable
settlement of disputes; community connectedness by restoring the influence of
neighborhood and community values and reducing social friction; an accessible
forum for all disputants, including previously unrepresented individuals; a
reduction in court congestion and costs; and an example of how to effectively
resolve disputes without resorting to violence or adversarial proceedings.
Id.
211 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1746, 1753 (2011).
212 See Fortin, supra note 210, at 618.
213 Carole Silver, Models of Quality for Third Parties in Alternative Dispute
Resolution, 12 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 37, 49–50 n.32 (1996).
214 See George A. Martinez, Race, American Law and the State of Nature, 112 W. VA.
L. REV. 799, 827–28 (2010).
215 See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT, E. DIST. OF N.Y., DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURES,
available at https://img.nyed.uscourts.gov/files/forms/DisputeResolutionProcedures.pdf.
216 Id.
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is not binding on the parties, and they are free to reject it and go
217
forward with the litigation. Not all such mediations are successful,
but many are and thereby free up judicial resources for other cases.
4. Settlement
Lawsuits are typically brought because parties to a dispute cannot
resolve their differences. But, even after the litigation has
commenced, parties may choose to settle the matter among
themselves rather than have the matter proceed to judicial resolution.
Indeed, the lawsuit itself may be the impetus for serious discussions
among the parties to resolve their dispute. Generally, settlements are
encouraged. Parties often prefer to have a say in the final outcome
rather than have that outcome imposed on them.
On the other hand, there are situations in which settlement does not
produce a desirable outcome. For example, when a defendant faces a
claim that is thin on the facts but very expensive to defend, he or she
may choose to settle rather than to seek exoneration through a trial,
because settlement is the more cost-effective alternative. Settlements
under these circumstances bear little relationship to the merits of the
218
claims and defenses, and defendants understandably feel coerced.
Also, when defendants settle cases in order to prevent public
disclosure of wrongdoing—such as the manufacture and sale of
defective products—and then insist on keeping the details of the
settlement confidential, settlement does not serve the interests of the
public at large.
III
FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM AT THE CROSSROADS
The events of the last three decades clearly demonstrate that the
federal civil justice system is now at a crossroads. Courts and litigants
seem to have lost sight of the overarching goal of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure—that meritorious litigants should have their day in
court. Concern about high costs of litigation have trumped concern
that meritorious claims go to trial. By granting summary judgment or
motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and by denying class
action certification, the courts are adjudicating matters on truncated

217
218

Id.
See Handler, The Shift, supra note 52, at 9–12.
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records at points earlier and earlier on the litigation timeline. This
approach surely saves discovery costs, but we should query whether it
gives the plaintiff a fair shot at airing his or her claims.
As discussed above, cost concerns have also led litigants to select
220
This flight from the
foreign forums or to opt for ADR solutions.
court system, combined with the trend to decide cases at points much
earlier on the litigation timeline, has created the phenomenon of the
221
vanishing civil trial. Although the flight from the court system may
have short-term benefits for those involved in legal disputes, in the
long run, it serves neither the private interest of litigants nor the
public interest.
A. The Importance of Providing and Supporting a Robust Public
Court System
Courts have traditionally played a key role in resolving disputes
among citizens. First, the court system helps to establish behavioral
222
norms so that people can live together in harmony.
Second, the
courts provide a public forum in which litigants can assert and resolve
223
grievances.
Third, the courts are a valuable source of information
224
for the public. It is imperative that these functions be preserved.
1. Establishing Behavioral Norms
A key function of the law is to create and enforce behavioral
norms. As Judge Weinstein has observed, “[f]or law to serve its
function as giving expression to enforceable behavioral norms, it must
225
Court decisions are available to
be made publicly for all to see.”
all; they not only inform the public of what the law is but also enable
226
people to predict outcomes and adjust their conduct accordingly.

219 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 116–19 (noting the trend
to move case dispositions to points even earlier on the litigation timeline through summary
judgment, motions to dismiss, Daubert motions, and class certification).
220 See supra Part II.C.
221 See Higginbotham, supra note 5, at 747.
222 See Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice Through
ADR, 11 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 241, 248–49 (1996) [hereinafter Weinsten, Benefits
and Risks].
223 Id. at 251.
224 See id. at 248–51.
225 Id. at 249.
226 Id.
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2. Public Forum to Resolve Disputes
The court system provides a public forum, accessible to all, for the
resolution of disputes among citizens through litigation. Although
some observers have criticized the United States as a litigious
227
society, litigation itself is not bad. Rather, litigation is an important
tool in the civil justice system. Indeed, the courts exist to bring about
228
the “just, speedy, and inexpensive” resolution of claims. Litigation
plays a crucial role in preserving and extending the rule of law.
a. The Public Interest Is Served Through Litigation
The court system provides more than just a public forum for
resolving disputes. Courts, through litigation, construe statutes and
common law precedents through principled decisions. Judicial
229
Parties to a
decisions are subject to public scrutiny and protest.
case may appeal adverse results. Through the appellate process, legal
issues are carefully and thoughtfully analyzed and resolved. Decisions
of the United States Supreme Court become the law of the land.
Under stare decisis, common law assures that like cases are treated
alike.
The Constitution confers adjudicatory powers on the judiciary.
However, as the Supreme Court observed in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court “cannot buy support
for its decisions . . . and, except to a minor degree, it cannot
230
independently coerce obedience to its decrees.”
Rather, the Court
noted, its “power lies . . . in its legitimacy, a product of substance and
perception that shows itself in the people’s acceptance of the
Judiciary as fit to determine what the Nation’s law means and to
231
declare what it demands.” Legitimacy requires more than justifying
a judicial act by reference to legal principle; “the Court’s legitimacy
depends on making legally principled decisions under circumstances
227 See Marc Galanter, The Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 3–5
(1986). But see Weinstein, After Fifty Years, supra note 20, at 1907–09 (“Concern over
excessive litigation in the federal courts is old hat . . . [and] also typically exaggeration. . . .
The truth about the ‘litigation explosion’ is that it is a weapon of perception, not substance.
If the public can be persuaded that there is a litigation crisis, it may support efforts to cut
back on litigation access.”).
228 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
229 See Weinstein, Benefits and Risks, supra note 222, at 250–51.
230 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
231 Id.
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in which their principled character is sufficiently plausible to be
232
accepted by the Nation.”
That the Court’s decision be viewed as legitimate is especially
important when fundamental rights are at stake. For example,
decisions by the Supreme Court on civil rights issues—such as, the
right to vote or the right to be free from racial discrimination—inure
for the benefit of the entire populace and not just the parties before
the court.
Although access to public courts is important, the right of access is
not without limitations. The doctrines of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion, closely related to the concept of stare decisis, bar a party
from relitigating claims and from relitigating issues that have
previously been litigated and decided by the courts. These concepts
thereby promote not only consistency of results but also provide
233
peace and efficiency to the litigants and the courts.
b. Development of the Law
Litigation plays a key role in the development of the law. First,
litigation is a vehicle for overruling bad precedents. The rulings in
some cases are simply wrong and should be overruled. For example,
234
the “separate but equal” doctrine enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson,
which licensed state-sanctioned racial segregation, was morally
offensive and contrary to the Constitution. Plessy, of course, was
235
eventually overruled by Brown v. Board of Education. As a result
of Brown, state-authorized racial segregation was illegal throughout
236
the United States.
Imagine if Brown had been decided by an
arbitrator instead of the courts. Any arbitrator’s decision would not
have been the law of the land but rather would have bound only those
who had been parties to the proceedings. Litigation brought about a
major change in the law that an arbitrator would have been powerless
to implement.
Other cases, although perhaps not morally offensive like Plessy,
are nevertheless wrongly decided and also should be overruled. These
cases attract criticism from commentators and the courts, calling for

232

Id. at 866.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18, 27 (1982). Claim preclusion is
sometimes referred to as the rule of merger. Id. § 23.
234 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
235 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).
236 See id. at 495–96.
233
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237

the precedent to be reexamined. The Erie
line of cases is an apt
example. This line of cases begins with the 1840 decision of Swift v.
Tyson, in which the Supreme Court held that a federal court sitting in
diversity is free to ignore a state’s common law and apply instead
238
federal general common law.
Over the next century, it became
clear that Swift had (1) failed to produce the hoped-for uniform law
governing commercial practices, (2) gave rise to the unsavory forumshopping tactics, (3) produced blatantly unfair results, and (4)
239
probably misconstrued the Rules of Decisions Act ab initio. In its
lifetime, Swift had been the target of withering judicial and academic
240
criticism.
In 1938, the Supreme Court in Erie overruled Swift, concluding
that Swift was “‘an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts
241
of the United States.’”
Diversity jurisdiction may offer litigants a
federal forum, but it does not entitle them to results that would be
242
substantially different from the results in state court. After Erie, the
rule of decision in diversity cases was provided by state law, whether
statutory or court-made, thereby minimizing the true evils of forumshopping and inequitable administration of the law.
Similarly, in the area of prior judgments, litigation has been the
vehicle to eliminate bad precedents. It is a fundamental rule of res
judicata that a person who is not a party to a judgment cannot be
243
bound by that judgment. But may a person who is not a party to a
judgment benefit from that judgment? Initially, the courts answered
that question in the negative and developed the rule of mutuality of
estoppel: one not bound by a judgment cannot benefit from that
244
judgment.
The rule of mutuality “provided a party who had
237

Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41 U.S. 1, 18 (1842).
239 Erie, 304 U.S. at 74–79.
240 Id. at 74 nn.7–8.
241 Id. at 79.
242 See id.
243 Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892–93 (2008); Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,
761–62 (1989) (“‘[I]t is a principle of general application in Anglo-American
jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a litigation in which he
is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by service of
process.’ . . . This rule is part of our ‘deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should
have his own day in court.’” (citations omitted)).
244 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 127
(1912) (“It is a principle of general elementary law that the estoppel of a judgment must be
mutual.”).
238
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litigated and lost in a previous action an opportunity to relitigate
245
identical issues with new parties.” The rule of mutuality, which is
246
often ran counter to basic rules of preclusion,
rooted in fairness,
247
which are rooted in finality, efficiency, and consistency. Too often,
the rule of mutuality simply permitted the defendant to get a second
bite of the apple and relitigate a case that it already lost once before.
The courts first created fact-specific exceptions to the rule of
248
mutuality.
Eventually, however, it became clear that the rule
limited the application of collateral estoppel principles without
249
significant concomitant benefit. As long as a defendant had his or
her day in court, i.e., a full and fair opportunity to litigate the case, the
defendant was foreclosed from relitigating issues that had been raised,
250
litigated, and adjudicated in prior actions.
Finally, litigation played a key role in the evolution of the law of
vertical restraints in antitrust law. In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn
& Co., the Supreme Court held that when a manufacturer departed
with “title, dominion, and risk” with respect to a good that it had sold,
any effort by the manufacturer to control where and to whom a
reseller could dispose of the product was unlawful on its face under
251
section one of the Sherman Act.
Schwinn generated confusion in
the marketplace and was the subject of significant academic
252
criticism.
A decade later, the Supreme Court reversed Schwinn in
the landmark Sylvania case and held that vertically imposed territorial
restraints are unlawful only when the plaintiff can prove demonstrable

245

Parklane Hosiery Co., Inc. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 327 (1979).
See id.
247 See Allan D. Vestal, Res Judicata/Preclusion by Judgment: The Law Applied in
Federal Courts, 66 MICH. L. REV. 1723, 1723 (1968).
248 See, e.g., Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349–50
(1971) (determining that a defendant in a patent infringement litigation may plead issue
preclusion when the patent had been held invalid in a prior case against another
defendant); Bernhard v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust & Sav. Ass’n, 122 P.2d 892, 895–96
(Cal. 1942) (holding that the rule of mutuality does not apply in cases of imputed liability
when a plaintiff unsuccessfully sues the alleged active tortfeasor and then seeks to sue the
alleged passive wrongdoer). “No satisfactory rationalization has been advanced for the
requirement of mutuality. Just why a party who was not bound by a previous action should
be precluded from asserting it as res judicata against a party who was bound by it is
difficult to comprehend.” Id. at 895.
249 See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 331–32.
250 Id. at 332–33.
251 388 U.S. 365, 381–82 (1967).
252 See Continental T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 48 n.13 (1977).
246
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253

anticompetitive effects.
Rarely is that the case, and today, nonprice vertical restraints are virtually per se lawful.
Sylvania led to a rethinking of vertically imposed price restraints—
resale price maintenance (“r/p/m”). In its 1911 Dr. Miles decision, the
254
Critics of Dr.
Supreme Court ruled that r/p/m was per se illegal.
Miles argued that, in the wave of Sylvania, per se condemnation of
255
r/p/m was no longer viable. Critics also argued that r/p/m, as in the
case of non-price vertical restraints, may offer significant procompetitive benefits, including promotion of inter-brand competition,
introduction of services to the buyer, elimination of free riding and
256
Accordingly, r/p/m ought not to be
promotion of new products.
condemned out of hand.
The Supreme Court first addressed maximum r/p/m in State Oil
Co. v. Khan, ruling that maximum r/p/m generally resulted in low
prices to consumers and consequently ought not to be summarily
257
condemned. The Court in Khan, however, left for another day the
258
issue of minimum r/p/m and thus did not disturb Dr. Miles.
Nevertheless, when the Court did revisit Dr. Miles in Leegin v. PSKS,
Inc., it overruled Dr. Miles—relying heavily on the principles set
forth in both Sylvania and Khan—holding that r/p/m should be
condemned only when anticompetitive effects outweigh any pro259
competitive benefits.
c. Certainty and Predictability in the Law
Litigation also promotes certainty and predictability in the law. The
r/p/m line of cases also illustrates this point. Soon after Dr. Miles,
courts authorized ways around the per se rule. For example, in United
States v. Colgate & Co., the Court held that a manufacturer could
unilaterally announce in advance its terms of sale, including a
260
“suggested” resale price. As long as the retailer did not “agree” to
those terms, the conduct would be outside the scope of the first
253

Id. at 59.
See Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 407–09 (1911).
255 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
288–91 (1978).
256 Id.
257 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997).
258 Id. (making clear that Khan addresses only maximum price fixing).
259 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 899–901, 907
(2007).
260 250 U.S. 300, 306–07 (1919).
254
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261

section of the Sherman Act. On the one hand, if the retailer sold at
a price other than the suggested resale price, it could be lawfully
terminated under Colgate. In addition, courts held that when the
manufacturer retained legal ownership of the goods and distributed
262
them through an agency model, Dr. Miles did not apply.
Colgate and its progeny created significant uncertainties in
distribution law as to (1) what constituted an agreement to fix resale
prices; (2) whether the termination of a discounting retailer was the
unilateral act of the manufacturer or done in concert with, and at the
behest of, complaining rivals of the discounter; (3) precisely what
steps a manufacturer could take in enforcing its “unilateral” terms of
sale; and (4) whether the manufacturer’s distribution system was a
true agency relationship or a disguised sales system dressed up as an
agency model. The answer to these questions created a patchwork
263
quilt of confusing and often inconsistent precedents.
Leegin eliminated the uncertainties that arose in the aftermath of
Colgate. All vertical restraints would be adjudged under the rule of
264
reason. No longer would courts engage in technical hairsplitting as
to whether (1) conduct is unilateral or conspiratorial, (2) the
distribution system is a true agency system, or (3) the resale price is
suggested or mandatory. The question post-Leegin is whether the
anticompetitive effects of the conduct outweigh the pro-competitive
265
benefits.
Certainty and predictability clearly benefit buyers and sellers
participating in a given marketplace who can now predict the
consequences of their actions with some certainty. Clear rules also
make law accessible to litigants seeking to bring private enforcement
actions, and it facilitates private rights of action. Moreover, as rules
become clearer and more predictable, the need for litigation in the
long run is diminished.

261

See id.
United States v. Gen. Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 486–88, 490 (1926).
263 See Leegin, 551 U.S. at 902–04 (pointing out the confusion that has arisen in the
wake of Dr. Miles and concluding that “it is a flawed antitrust doctrine that serves the
interests of lawyers―by creating legal distinctions that operate as traps for the
unwary―by requiring manufacturers to choose second-best options to achieve sound
business objectives”).
264 Id. at 882.
265 See id. at 882, 892.
262
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3. Public Courts Provide Information
The court system also functions as an important source of
266
For
information which may bear on public safety and welfare.
example, lawsuits can call public attention to life-threatening defects
in the design or manufacture of automobiles or to heretofore
undisclosed side effects of certain prescription medicines. Were
people left solely to private means of dispute resolution, these
problems might never come to light and continue to menace society.
B. The Downsides of ADR
First, ADR is one-dimensional in the sense that it is geared solely
toward dispute resolution; ADR panels are accountable only to the
(paying) parties before them. ADR may effectively resolve the private
dispute before the panel, but that which serves private interests does
not necessarily serve the public interest as well. In litigation, the
267
courts monitor the public interest; no one fills that role in ADR.
Second, unlike court decisions, ADR decisions are not subject to
public scrutiny. For example, ADR decisions are not systematically
reported. ADR panels are not required to issue reasoned decisions,
nor are they bound by prior decisions, whether by courts or other
ADR panels. Principles of stare decisis do not apply to ADR. ADR
rulings are not appealable within the court system. Accordingly, the
“law” that evolves through ADR is not accessible to the public; and
there is no systemic mechanism for the law to evolve in the ADR
realm. Rather, ADR may serve to freeze the law at a given point in
time.
Third, ADR may be used as an instrument of oppression when
parties to a dispute lack equal bargaining power. It is one thing to
agree to ADR as part of an arm’s length negotiation. It is quite
another for a dominant seller to impose ADR upon an unwary
consumer or customer. For example, in the securities industry,
brokers use contracts of adhesion with ADR provisions to steer
268
disputes clear of the courts.
This tactical use of ADR to forumshop and avoid unfavorable judicial precedent is not what ADR
proponents had in mind in trumpeting the benefits of ADR.

266
267
268

Weinstein, Benefits and Risks, supra note 222, at 251.
Id. at 260, 262–63.
Id. at 260–61.
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Fourth, this tactical use of ADR calls into question the fairness of
269
the process.
In the courts, judges are randomly assigned to cases
and must disqualify themselves if they have bias or any financial
interest in the case. In ADR cases, particularly securities cases, panel
members are often drawn from the ranks of industry management and
270
may bring with them a pro-industry bias.
More fundamentally, as the wealthy flee the courts system, a twotiered system of justice is taking shape: a private system of ADR for
the wealthy, and a public court system that is left to handle criminal
271
cases and disputes among the poor.
This flight from the courts
272
threatens to reduce the power of the courts over society generally.
Fifth, ADR has generally been touted as cheaper than litigating in
the courts. That is not necessarily so today. Arbitrations, in particular,
mimic full-blown judicial trials, with extensive pre-hearing
273
discovery.
In ADR, parties may incur significant upfront fees for
274
the panels and administrative expenses. This is, of course, not the
case in the court system in which judges are compensated through tax
dollars, and litigants pay flat filing fees to cover administrative costs.
Nor does ADR necessarily reduce attorneys fees, since attorneys must
be paid whether in court or in ADR.
Equally important, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have
detailed standards for moving cases along from complaint to
resolution. ADR cases, on the other hand, move at a pace dictated by
275
the panels; proceedings could be drawn out for years. Rather than
have the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to govern proceedings,
ADR subjects parties to the panel’s make-it-up-as-you-go protocol.
IV
GETTING BACK ON TRACK IN THE POST-TWOMBLY WORLD
The federal courts have a unique opportunity to reclaim litigants
who have migrated to ADR over the last three decades. To do so, the
courts must adjust to the realities of twenty-first century litigation
with a three-pronged strategy. First, the courts must embrace the
269

See id. at 261.
Id.
271 Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted).
272 Id. at 261–62.
273 See Ileana Blanco & Tanya C. Edwards, Arbitration v. Litigation Pros and Cons:
What Business Lawyers Need to Know, 69 TEX. B. J. 858, 859 (2006).
274 Id.
275 Id.
270
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proportionality standards for pleading suggested in Twombly, which
means that the amount of factual detail required for a pleading to
survive a motion to dismiss varies depending on the complexity of the
case. Second, the courts must impose appropriate limitations on
discovery as authorized by the Federal Rules. Third, the courts must
set, and adhere to, deadlines for the completion of discovery and the
commencement of trial.
A. Harmonizing the Ideals of the Federal Rules with Realities of
Litigation
1. Proportionality
The plausibility standard enunciated in Twombly and reaffirmed in
276
Iqbal is fluid, not fixed. In a nutshell, Twombly and Iqbal held that
the level of factual content in the complaint is directly proportional to
277
Thus,
the complexity of the case and the likely discovery costs.
when a plaintiff alleges a complex antitrust conspiracy, threadbare
allegations of agreement coupled with stray assertions of consciously
278
parallel behavior simply will not pass muster under Twombly. On
the other hand, in a run-of-the-mill negligence claim arising from an
279
automobile accident, detailed factual allegations are unnecessary.
The Court in Twombly and Iqbal was also concerned with the high
costs of false positives. In Twombly, the Court declined to condemn
conduct “just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and
competitive business strategy unilaterally prompted by common
perceptions of the market” as it would have with unlawful
280
conspiracy.
Condemning conduct that could be just as consistent
with “competition” as it would be with “conspiracy” would tend to
281
chill beneficial pro-competitive behavior. On the other hand, when
the conduct is more egregious and less defensible, the enhanced
282
pleading standards of Twombly and Iqbal “[are] not justified.”

276

See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 134–35.
See Cooney v. Rossiter, 583 F.3d 967, 971 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he height of the
pleading requirement is relative to circumstances.”).
278 See In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 625–26 (7th Cir. 2010).
279 See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 565 n.10 (2007).
280 Id. at 554.
281 Id.
282 Mark Anderson & Max Huffman, Iqbal, Twombly, and the Expected Cost of False
Positive Error, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 66 (2010).
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Context, good judgment, and common sense―not any quick
fact/conclusion bucketing—should guide the court’s decision on the
sufficiency of a complaint challenged on a motion to dismiss. This is
nothing new. As the court in Austen v. Catterton Partners V, LP
observed, “[c]ontext, good judgment and common sense mattered
283
long before the Supreme Court decided Twombly and Iqbal.” The
court in Austen offered the following example as to how Twombly and
Iqbal should be sensibly applied in passing on the sufficiency of a
complaint without jumping into the thorny fact/conclusion thicket.
If a plaintiff says that a defendant intended to, and did, punch the
plaintiff in the nose, is that a statement of fact about the defendant’s
act and intent, or is it a conclusion since none of us is a mind reader?
In most circumstances, the Court would consider that statement to be
one of fact that the Court would be required to assume is true for
purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. On the other hand, if a plaintiff
baldly asserts that she was subjected to a “hostile work environment”
without more, the Court would consider that statement be a mere
conclusion—in the parlance of the Supreme Court, a “threadbare
recital”—to which the Court need not defer. In the latter example,
further facts would be needed (and in this example, the plaintiff
certainly would know what environment she had been subjected to) in
order to provide adequate notice to the defendant of the basis for the
lawsuit and to make the plaintiff’s hostile work environment claim
284
plausible.
2. Special Cases
Certain factual situations call for the courts to be circumspect in
applying Twombly. For example, the Supreme Court has made clear
that Twombly does not change the longstanding policy of giving pro
285
Courts should be
se plaintiffs wide latitude in pleading.
circumspect in dismissing complaints when evidence of wrongdoing
286
Under those
is in the hands of the defendant exclusively.
circumstances, the plaintiff cannot prove its case without access to
defendant’s files but, at the same time, cannot get discovery without
first suing. In such cases, the better approach would be for the court to
283

Austen v. Catterton Partners V, LP, 709 F. Supp. 2d 168, 172 (D. Conn. 2010).
Id. at 171–72.
285 See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007).
286 See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 137; see, e.g., Bausch v.
Stryker Corp., 630 F.3d 546, 558 (7th Cir. 2010) (finding an error to dismiss with
prejudice where relevant information was confidential under federal law).
284
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give plaintiff the opportunity to conduct limited and specifically
targeted discovery before considering a motion to dismiss the
287
complaint. The amount of discovery allowed in such cases would
be governed by the proportionality principles embedded in Rule
288
26(b)(3) and the sound discretion of the court.
In addition, in private damage actions that follow successful
government prosecutions of the defendant(s), motions to dismiss on
Twombly grounds should be granted only in the most unusual cases.
The success of the prior government prosecutions should allay any
289
concern that the private action is “largely groundless.”
In these
cases, a poorly drafted complaint is best addressed by a remedy other
than dismissal. In short, there is a presumption of merit in private
actions that are follow-ons to successful government enforcement
actions. This presumption of merit would apply, however, when
defendants are merely subject to a government investigation, and no
action has been filed.
3. Dismissal Without Prejudice
As a general matter, courts can ease the harshness of Twombly by
290
If the plaintiff
dismissing defective complaints without prejudice.
fails to address the deficiencies in its complaint after they have been
identified by the courts, dismissal with prejudice is appropriate. Of
course, in those cases when no amount of factual allegations can cure
the defects in the complaint, the trial court may dismiss with prejudice
in the first instance.
B. Embrace the Federal Rules on Discovery
As discussed above, the driving force behind the Twombly holding
was the Court’s concern about the high cost of discovery and the fact
that the threat of high discovery costs can be used to coerce
settlements that may not be justified by the merits of a claim. The
high cost of discovery has been, and continues to be, a major issue in
federal civil litigation. At the same time, the Court’s cavalier
287

See Cavanagh, Making Sense of Twombly, supra note 8, at 137.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
289 Cf. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007) (citations omitted).
290 In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 781 F. Supp. 2d. 955, 959 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (“The Ninth Circuit has ‘repeatedly held that a district court should grant leave to
amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the
pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” (citation omitted)).
288
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dismissiveness of the discovery scheme under the Federal Rules is
troublesome. The Court simply throws up its hands and says that
discovery is controlled by the parties, not the court. That is simply not
the case. The 1983 Amendments and the 1993 Amendments to the
Federal Rules vest the trial court with broad powers to control
discovery. The trial court must approve a discovery plan before the
291
process can begin.
As part of the planning process, the court can
292
the
impose numerical limits on the number of interrogatories,
293
and the court can limit the length of any
number of depositions,
294
deposition. Courts can control discovery and its costs.
The Court’s dismissiveness is also troubling from a process
perspective. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern procedure
and practice in federal courts. Trial courts are not free to disregard
rules that they believe are ineffective. If a rule does not work, it
should be changed through the established rulemaking process, not
simply ignored by the courts on an ad hoc basis. The willingness of
the Court in Twombly to ignore the Federal Rules raises issues of
fairness as well as the appearance of fairness.
Thus, the problems of discovery costs are not for want of having
tools to control those costs, but rather for lack of will of judges to
utilize those tools. The rules cannot work if they are not utilized. To
paraphrase John Lennon, “[a]ll we are saying is give [the rules] a
295
chance.” Active case management has long been recognized as an
effective vehicle for reducing costs and delay. This is not to suggest
that every case needs to be micromanaged. Nor is it necessary for the
judge to actively oversee discovery. A judge may elect to delegate
that task to a magistrate judge. The hallmark of the discovery rules is
their flexibility. The court can choose those cases that would benefit
from close oversight during the pretrial phase and decide in any given
case whether the judge or a magistrate judge is the appropriate case
manager. Discovery is manageable, and the surgical approach
embodied in the Federal Rules is preferable to the nuclear option
embraced by Twombly.

291
292
293
294
295

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f).
FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a).
FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(2).
Id.
PLASTIC ONO BAND, Give Peace a Chance (Apple Records 1969).
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C. Restore Confidence in the Federal Courts
For the last forty years, the federal courts have been under siege
from (1) defendants, who view the federal court system as too
expensive and time-consuming; (2) plaintiffs, who view the courts as
too eager to resolve cases short of trial; and (3) Congress, which
views the federal courts as too costly and unwieldy to effectively
serve the people. Whether public perceptions are accurate or not is
largely irrelevant because they have led to tangible consequences.
Defendants have fled federal courts in favor of ADR or foreign
forums. Plaintiffs have sought refuge in state courts. Congress
enacted the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 in an attempt to make
federal courts both accessible and cost-effective.
As discussed above, the ADR movement has had many benefits for
its participants, but it also has had some undesirable spillover effects.
First, it is now clear that ADR is not always voluntary and has been
used by large institutions to keep consumers out of the courts.
Second, ADR decisions do not create transparent precedent that is
known to all and enforceable in the courts. Rather, ADR creates
opaque precedents—that are known to arbitrators and participants in
ADR and not generally binding nor subject to judicial review.
It is crucial that we maintain a federal court system that is
accessible to all, that levels the playing field among litigants, that
offers juries as fact finders to bring the wisdom of the community to
bear on the resolution of a dispute, and that creates precedent that is
known to all and binding on all. Federal courts are public institutions
created by law and ultimately accountable to the public. The courts
are empowered to construe the law, to develop legal precedents
accessible to the public, and to make authoritative pronouncements
binding on the public. The federal courts, however, do more than
simply resolve disputes among parties. Federal courts provide
mechanisms, such as contempt, to assure that their decisions are
respected by the parties. Rulings of the courts can be tested by the
appellate process, and erroneous decisions can be corrected. Outdated
precedents can be cast aside in favor of rulings that reflect modern
realities.
None of this can be accomplished through ADR mechanisms or
settlement agreements. As Professor Owen Fiss observed:
Adjudication uses public resources, and employs not strangers
chosen by the parties but public officials chosen by a process in
which the public participates. These officials, like members of the
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legislative and executive branches, possess a power that has been
defined and conferred by public law, not by private agreement.
Their job is not to maximize the ends of private parties, nor simply
to secure the peace, but to explicate and give force to the values
embodied in authoritative texts such as the Constitution and
statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord
with them. This duty is not discharged when the parties settle.
In our political system, courts are reactive institutions. They do
not search out interpretive occasions, but instead wait for others to
bring matters to their attention. They also rely for the most part on
others to investigate and present the law and facts. A settlement will
thereby deprive a court of the occasions, and perhaps even the
ability, to render an interpretation. A court cannot proceed (or not
proceed very far) in the face of a settlement. To be against
settlement is not to urge that parties be “forced” to litigate, since
that would interfere with their autonomy and distort the adjudicative
process; the parties will be inclined to make the court believe that
their bargain is justice. To be against settlement is only to suggest
that when the parties settle, society gets less than what appears, and
for a price it does not know it is paying. Parties might settle while
leaving justice undone. The settlement of a school suit might secure
the peace, but not racial equality. Although the parties are prepared
to live under the terms they bargained for, and although such
peaceful coexistence may be a necessary precondition of justice,
and itself a state of affairs to be valued, it is not justice296
itself. To
settle for something means to accept less than some ideal.

Upon sober reflection, two propositions are clear: (1) the federal
court, although not above reproach, has gotten a bad rap; and (2)
ADR is not a panacea for the perceived ills of the courts. But, how
does the court system reclaim those litigants who have fled? The
answer is not easy. Or, is it? The CJRA was a far-reaching reform
proposal that required each of the ninety-four district courts to study
the reason for unnecessary cost and delay in its particular district, and
then to propose a plan to address the specific problems identified. The
CJRA, however, did little to affect the perceived problems of
excessive cost and delay. Rather, it created more confusion than
clarity by adding yet another layer of local rules to the court system.
Evaluating the CJRA in 1997, the RAND Corporation acknowledged
297
that the CJRA had failed to achieve its goals.
After millions of dollars had been poured into the CJRA, RAND,
in its evaluation, concluded that the most effective tools to limit
excessive costs and delay were through the courts establishing and
296
297

Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085–86 (1984).
See THE RAND REPORT, supra note 71, at 1–3.
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adhering to early and strict deadlines for the completion of discovery
and setting firm trial dates. Perhaps the way forward for federal courts
is simple: adhere to the Federal Rules; set and enforce early, firm
discovery deadlines; manage discovery when necessary; and permit
meritorious cases to proceed to trial. At the same time, the courts
should avail themselves of technological advances that make
litigation more efficient and the court system more user-friendly.
CONCLUSION
It is imperative that we maintain a vibrant federal civil justice
system, not only to resolve disputes among litigants but also to
maintain confidence in the rule of law. The court system must reclaim
the lost generation of litigants who have taken flight and become, in
Judge Weinstein’s words, “the beacon to which those with serious
298
substantive grievances could turn for direction toward justice.”

298

See Weinstein, After Fifty Years, supra note 20, at 1906.
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